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M
MCP Safeshell
作者 @antruongnguyen
GitHub 仓库(1 星标)

A safety-first shell command executor MCP server. Supports both stdio and HTTP (SSE/Streamable HTTP) transports, with built-in permission gating, sensitive-location protection, activity logging, and cross-platform support.

创建于 4/2/2026
更新于 about 3 hours ago
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Repository documentation and setup instructions

SafeShell MCP Server

A safety-first shell command executor for the Model Context Protocol. Built in Rust with the rmcp SDK.

SafeShell lets AI assistants run shell commands while enforcing safety guardrails: commands are classified, protected paths are hard-blocked, dangerous operations require human approval, and sensitive environment variables are automatically redacted from output.

Features

  • Command classification — commands are categorized as safe (auto-execute) or dangerous (requires approval)
  • Protected path enforcement — hard-blocks writes to system directories (/etc, /boot, C:\Windows, etc.)
  • Human-in-the-loop — dangerous commands prompt for approval via MCP elicitation
  • Chained command analysis — each sub-command in pipes/chains is classified independently
  • Symlink protection — paths are canonicalized before guard checks
  • Output limits — configurable max output size with truncation reporting
  • Secret redaction — sensitive env var values are replaced with [REDACTED] in output
  • Concurrency control — semaphore-based limit on simultaneous executions
  • Dual transport — supports both stdio and streamable HTTP (SSE)
  • Graceful shutdown — signal handling with child process cleanup
  • Cross-platform — macOS, Linux, Windows

Architecture

                    ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
                    │              MCP Client                      │
                    │  (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, etc.)     │
                    └────────────────┬─────────────────────────────┘
                                     │
                          stdio or HTTP/SSE
                                     │
                    ┌────────────────▼─────────────────────────────┐
                    │         SafeShell MCP Server                 │
                    │                                              │
                    │  Tools:                                      │
                    │   • execute_command                          │
                    │   • get_system_path                          │
                    │   • list_safe_commands                       │
                    │   • list_protected_paths                     │
                    │                                              │
                    │  ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
                    │  │        Safety Pipeline                 │  │
                    │  │                                        │  │
                    │  │  1. Parse ─► Tokenize, resolve paths   │  │
                    │  │       │                                │  │
                    │  │  2. Classify ─► Safe or Dangerous      │  │
                    │  │       │                                │  │
                    │  │  3. Location Guard ─► Protected paths  │  │
                    │  │       │               (hard block)     │  │
                    │  │       │                                │  │
                    │  │  4. Permission Gate ─► User approval   │  │
                    │  │       │               (elicitation)    │  │
                    │  │       │                                │  │
                    │  │  5. Execute ─► Run, sanitize output    │  │
                    │  │                                        │  │
                    │  └────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
                    │                                              │
                    │  Platform Layer (macOS / Linux / Windows)    │
                    │   • Safe command allowlists                  │
                    │   • Protected path definitions               │
                    └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Installation

Pre-built binaries

Download from GitHub Releases:

| Platform | Binary | |----------|--------| | macOS (Apple Silicon) | safeshell-mcp-macos-arm64 | | Linux (x86_64) | safeshell-mcp-linux-x86_64 | | Linux (ARM64) | safeshell-mcp-linux-arm64 | | Windows (x86_64) | safeshell-mcp-windows-x86_64.exe | | Windows (x86) | safeshell-mcp-windows-x86.exe |

Build from source

Requires Rust 1.85+ (edition 2024).

cargo install --path .

Or build a release binary (optimized for size):

cargo build --release
# Binary at target/release/safeshell-mcp

Quick start

1. Run with stdio transport (default)

safeshell-mcp

The server reads MCP messages from stdin and writes to stdout. This is the standard transport for MCP client integrations.

2. Run with HTTP transport

safeshell-mcp --transport http

By default, listens on 127.0.0.1:3456. Override with --bind:

safeshell-mcp --transport http --bind 0.0.0.0:8080

3. Connect an MCP client

See MCP Client Integration below for Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, and VS Code configuration.

Tools

SafeShell exposes four MCP tools:

execute_command

Run a shell command through the safety pipeline.

Parameters:

| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description | |-----------|------|----------|---------|-------------| | command | string | yes | — | The command to run | | args | string[] | no | [] | Command arguments | | working_directory | string | no | cwd | Working directory for the command | | timeout_seconds | integer | no | 30 | Maximum execution time in seconds |

Example:

{
  "command": "ls",
  "args": ["-la", "/tmp"],
  "working_directory": "/home/user",
  "timeout_seconds": 60
}

Pipeline: the command passes through five stages before execution:

  1. Parse — tokenize the command, split chains (&&, ||, |, ;), resolve ~ and relative paths to absolute paths
  2. Classify — categorize each sub-command as safe or dangerous; if any sub-command is dangerous, the whole chain is dangerous
  3. Location Guard — check resolved paths (including redirection targets like > /etc/shadow) against protected directories; canonicalize symlinks before checking; hard-block violations
  4. Permission Gate — for dangerous commands, prompt the user for approval via MCP elicitation; if the client does not support elicitation, default to DENY
  5. Execute — run via the configured shell, enforce timeout, truncate output to max_output_bytes, redact sensitive env var values

get_system_path

List all directories in the PATH environment variable.

Returns: path_entries (array of directory paths), os, arch.

list_safe_commands

Show all commands pre-approved as safe for the current OS, plus any additional_safe_commands from config.

Returns: commands (array with name and description), additional_safe_commands, os, count.

list_protected_paths

Show all directories protected from command execution on the current OS, plus any additional_protected_paths from config.

Returns: paths (array with path, read_allowed, reason), additional_protected_paths, os, count.

Security model

SafeShell implements defense-in-depth with multiple independent layers:

Command classification

Every command is classified against a built-in allowlist. Commands explicitly listed as safe execute immediately. Everything else — including unknown commands — is classified as dangerous and requires user approval.

Dangerous commands are further divided into two tiers:

Tier 1: Catastrophic (NEVER whitelistable)

These commands are too destructive to ever be auto-approved. Even if added to additional_safe_commands, they are ignored and a warning is logged.

| Category | Commands | |----------|----------| | Privilege escalation | sudo, su, doas, pkexec, runas | | Disk destruction | mkfs, dd, shred, fdisk, parted, lvm | | System control | shutdown, reboot, halt, poweroff, init |

Tier 2: Whitelistable dangerous

These are dangerous but legitimate developer tools. They can be pre-approved via additional_safe_commands in config or SAFESHELL_SAFE_COMMANDS env var. This is useful when your MCP client does not support elicitation.

| Category | Commands | |----------|----------| | File operations | rm, rmdir, chmod, chown, chgrp, truncate | | Network commands | curl, wget, nc, ncat, netcat, ssh, scp, sftp, rsync, ftp | | Package managers | apt, apt-get, yum, dnf, pacman, brew, choco, pip, npm, cargo | | System services | systemctl, launchctl, kill, killall, pkill, mount, umount | | Shell interpreters | bash, sh, zsh, fish, csh, tcsh, dash, ksh, python, python3, perl, ruby, node |

When a whitelisted Tier 2 command executes, the tool response includes an annotation:

⚠️ Pre-approved via additional_safe_commands configuration. No interactive approval was requested.

When a non-whitelisted dangerous command is denied because elicitation is unavailable, the denial message includes instructions on how to pre-approve it.

For chained commands (ls | grep foo && rm file), each sub-command is classified independently. If any sub-command is dangerous, the entire chain requires approval. The approval prompt shows per-sub-command classification details.

Protected path enforcement

The location guard checks all resolved path arguments (including redirection targets like > /etc/shadow) against OS-specific protected directories.

  • Safe commands (read-only): allowed to access protected paths where read_allowed: true (e.g., cat /etc/hosts is allowed)
  • Dangerous commands (write): blocked from all protected paths regardless of read_allowed
  • Symlink resolution: paths are canonicalized via fs::canonicalize() before checking, preventing symlink bypass attacks (e.g., /tmp/link → /etc/shadow)
  • Null byte injection: paths containing \0 are rejected
  • /proc/self/root traversal (Linux): paths through /proc/self/root or /proc/<pid>/root are blocked to prevent chroot escapes

Protected path violations are hard-blocked — they cannot be overridden by user approval.

Human-in-the-loop approval

Dangerous commands that pass the location guard are presented to the user via MCP elicitation. The user sees the full command and the reason it was flagged, and must explicitly approve execution.

If the MCP client does not support elicitation, the command is denied by default.

Output sanitization

After execution, stdout and stderr are:

  1. Truncated to max_output_bytes per stream (default: 100 KB), with a [OUTPUT TRUNCATED] marker
  2. Redacted — environment variable values matching sensitive name patterns are replaced with [REDACTED]

Built-in sensitive patterns match: SECRET, PASSWORD, PASSWD, TOKEN, API_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, ACCESS_KEY, AUTH, CREDENTIAL, DATABASE_URL, CONNECTION_STRING, SMTP. Values shorter than 4 characters are skipped to avoid false positives. Additional patterns can be added via redact_env_patterns in config.

Concurrency control

A semaphore limits simultaneous command executions to max_concurrency (default: 1). Excess requests receive an immediate error rather than queueing.

Graceful shutdown

Signal handlers (SIGINT/SIGTERM on Unix, CTRL_C on Windows) trigger graceful shutdown. All tracked child processes are terminated before the server exits.

Configuration

SafeShell is configured via a TOML file. All fields are optional — sensible defaults apply.

Config file search order

| Priority | Location | |----------|----------| | 1 | Path in $SAFESHELL_CONFIG environment variable | | 2 | ./safeshell.toml (current working directory) | | 3 | ~/.config/safeshell/config.toml |

If no config file is found, all defaults are used.

Full configuration reference

# Command timeout (seconds)
default_timeout_seconds = 30

# Max output per stream in bytes (stdout/stderr each)
max_output_bytes = 102400

# Max concurrent command executions
max_concurrency = 1

# Additional commands treated as safe (beyond built-in list)
additional_safe_commands = ["make", "just", "nx"]

# Additional regex patterns for env var names to redact
redact_env_patterns = ["(?i)MY_COMPANY_.*"]

# Override shell (auto-detected if unset)
# shell = "/bin/bash"

# HTTP bind address (used with --transport http when --bind is not set)
# http_bind = "127.0.0.1:3456"

# Log level filter (e.g. "debug", "info", "warn", "safeshell_mcp=debug")
# log_level = "info"

# Path to an additional log file (logs always go to stderr too)
# log_file = "/var/log/safeshell.log"

# Additional protected paths
[[additional_protected_paths]]
path = "/data/production"
read_allowed = true

[[additional_protected_paths]]
path = "/secrets"
read_allowed = false

Configuration defaults

| Setting | Default | Description | |---------|---------|-------------| | default_timeout_seconds | 30 | Max execution time per command | | max_output_bytes | 102400 (100 KB) | Max bytes per output stream before truncation | | max_concurrency | 1 | Max simultaneous command executions | | additional_safe_commands | [] | Extra commands to treat as safe (Tier 1 catastrophic commands like sudo, dd, shutdown cannot be overridden; Tier 2 commands like rm, curl, npm can be whitelisted) | | additional_protected_paths | [] | Extra directories to protect | | redact_env_patterns | [] | Extra regex patterns for sensitive env var names | | shell | auto-detect | Shell binary for execution | | http_bind | "127.0.0.1:3456" | HTTP listen address (when using --transport http) | | log_level | "info" | Log filter (via RUST_LOG env or config) | | log_file | none | Optional file path for log output |

Environment variables

Individual config fields can be overridden via SAFESHELL_* environment variables. These take precedence over config file values.

| Variable | Config field | Description | |----------|-------------|-------------| | SAFESHELL_CONFIG | — | Path to config file (highest priority for file location) | | SAFESHELL_TIMEOUT | default_timeout_seconds | Command timeout in seconds | | SAFESHELL_MAX_OUTPUT | max_output_bytes | Max output per stream in bytes | | SAFESHELL_MAX_CONCURRENCY | max_concurrency | Max simultaneous executions | | SAFESHELL_SHELL | shell | Shell binary path | | SAFESHELL_HTTP_BIND | http_bind | HTTP listen address | | SAFESHELL_LOG_LEVEL | log_level | Log filter string | | SAFESHELL_LOG_FILE | log_file | Log file path | | SAFESHELL_SAFE_COMMANDS | additional_safe_commands | Comma-separated list of additional safe commands (Tier 1 catastrophic commands cannot be overridden) | | SAFESHELL_REDACT_PATTERNS | redact_env_patterns | Comma-separated list of regex patterns for env var redaction | | RUST_LOG | — | Log level filter (overridden by log_level / SAFESHELL_LOG_LEVEL) | | SHELL (Unix) | — | Default shell when shell is not set | | COMSPEC (Windows) | — | Default shell when shell is not set |

Precedence: environment variables > config file > defaults.

Invalid numeric values (for SAFESHELL_TIMEOUT, SAFESHELL_MAX_OUTPUT, SAFESHELL_MAX_CONCURRENCY) are logged as warnings and ignored.

Example — configure via environment in an MCP client:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "safeshell": {
      "command": "/path/to/safeshell-mcp",
      "env": {
        "SAFESHELL_TIMEOUT": "120",
        "SAFESHELL_SAFE_COMMANDS": "make,just,nx",
        "SAFESHELL_LOG_LEVEL": "debug"
      }
    }
  }
}

Recommended safe command profiles

Pre-defined SAFESHELL_SAFE_COMMANDS values for common use cases. These whitelist Tier 2 dangerous commands appropriate for each role — Tier 1 catastrophic commands (sudo, dd, mkfs, shutdown, etc.) are always blocked regardless of configuration.

Developer — build tools, package managers, interpreters:

SAFESHELL_SAFE_COMMANDS="cargo,npm,pip,python3,node,bash,sh,curl,wget,rm,chmod,kill"

# safeshell.toml
additional_safe_commands = ["cargo", "npm", "pip", "python3", "node", "bash", "sh", "curl", "wget", "rm", "chmod", "kill"]

DevOps / SRE — developer commands plus system management:

SAFESHELL_SAFE_COMMANDS="cargo,npm,pip,python3,node,bash,sh,curl,wget,rm,chmod,chown,kill,killall,pkill,systemctl,launchctl,mount,umount,apt,apt-get,brew,rsync,ssh,scp"

# safeshell.toml
additional_safe_commands = [
  "cargo", "npm", "pip", "python3", "node", "bash", "sh",
  "curl", "wget", "rm", "chmod", "chown",
  "kill", "killall", "pkill", "systemctl", "launchctl",
  "mount", "umount", "apt", "apt-get", "brew",
  "rsync", "ssh", "scp",
]

Restrictive — minimal whitelist for untrusted environments:

SAFESHELL_SAFE_COMMANDS="npm,cargo,pip"

# safeshell.toml
additional_safe_commands = ["npm", "cargo", "pip"]

Recommended redact patterns

The built-in redaction patterns cover common sensitive variable names (SECRET, PASSWORD, TOKEN, API_KEY, AUTH, etc.). Add custom patterns via SAFESHELL_REDACT_PATTERNS or redact_env_patterns for your organization's naming conventions.

Common additions:

SAFESHELL_REDACT_PATTERNS="(?i).*KEY.*,(?i).*TOKEN.*,(?i).*AUTH.*,(?i).*CERT.*,(?i).*SIGNING.*"

# safeshell.toml
redact_env_patterns = [
  "(?i).*KEY.*",       # Matches: AWS_KEY, SIGNING_KEY, MY_API_KEY_V2, etc.
  "(?i).*TOKEN.*",     # Matches: GITHUB_TOKEN, REFRESH_TOKEN, etc.
  "(?i).*AUTH.*",      # Matches: OAUTH_SECRET, AUTH_HEADER, etc.
  "(?i).*CERT.*",      # Matches: TLS_CERT, CLIENT_CERT_PATH, etc.
  "(?i).*SIGNING.*",   # Matches: SIGNING_SECRET, JWT_SIGNING_KEY, etc.
]

Enterprise / compliance-heavy environments:

SAFESHELL_REDACT_PATTERNS="(?i).*KEY.*,(?i).*TOKEN.*,(?i).*AUTH.*,(?i).*CERT.*,(?i).*SIGNING.*,(?i).*ENCRYPT.*,(?i).*PRIVATE.*,(?i).*WEBHOOK.*,(?i).*DSN.*,(?i).*SENTRY.*"

Shell auto-detection

When shell is not set in config:

| Platform | Detection order | |----------|----------------| | Unix | $SHELL env var → /bin/sh fallback | | Windows | %COMSPEC% env var → cmd.exe fallback |

Shell flags are auto-detected: -c for POSIX shells and fish, -Command for PowerShell/pwsh, /C for cmd.exe.

MCP Client Integration

Ready-to-copy configuration files for all supported MCP hosts are available in the examples/ directory.

Claude Desktop

Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "safeshell": {
      "command": "/path/to/safeshell-mcp"
    }
  }
}

Claude Code

Add to your project's .mcp.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "safeshell": {
      "command": "/path/to/safeshell-mcp"
    }
  }
}

Or use HTTP transport:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "safeshell": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "http://127.0.0.1:3456/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Cursor

Add to .cursor/mcp.json in your project:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "safeshell": {
      "command": "/path/to/safeshell-mcp"
    }
  }
}

VS Code (Copilot)

Add to .vscode/mcp.json:

{
  "servers": {
    "safeshell": {
      "command": "/path/to/safeshell-mcp"
    }
  }
}

With custom configuration

Point to a config file via environment variable:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "safeshell": {
      "command": "/path/to/safeshell-mcp",
      "env": {
        "SAFESHELL_CONFIG": "/path/to/safeshell.toml"
      }
    }
  }
}

Safe commands

Built-in safe commands vary by OS. Use the list_safe_commands tool to see the full list for your platform.

Common safe commands (all platforms): echo, date, whoami, hostname

Unix (macOS + Linux): cat, ls, head, tail, wc, pwd, uname, which, printenv, df, uptime

Windows: dir, type, where, ver, set, cd

Commands not on the safe allowlist are classified as dangerous by default and require user approval.

License

MIT

快速设置
此服务器的安装指南

安装命令 （包未发布）

git clone https://github.com/antruongnguyen/mcp-safeshell
手动安装： 请查看 README 获取详细的设置说明和所需的其他依赖项。

Cursor 配置 (mcp.json)

{ "mcpServers": { "antruongnguyen-mcp-safeshell": { "command": "git", "args": [ "clone", "https://github.com/antruongnguyen/mcp-safeshell" ] } } }